Um alinhamento responsável à alguma versão do naturalismo filosófico requer a articulação explicita e cuidadosa de um argumento em sua defesa. Em quatro passos, o texto que segue abaixo expande e examina a validade de um argumento que é frequentemente rascunhado em favor do naturalismo. Como veremos, contudo, a versão do naturalismo que esse argumento nos permite é um pouco diferente dos naturalismos filosóficos mais populares.

O ceticismo é por vezes descartado como uma doutrina absurda e merecedora do seu lugar distante na antiguidade. Nada poderia ser menos correto. O ceticismo continua extremamente relevante para o pensamento filosófico e científico de hoje, servindo como um lembrete de que a sabedoria não é barata nem segura. Nesse texto, o meu objetivo principal é reproduzir o raciocínio das discussões clássicas sobre o ceticismo, mas de uma maneira coloquial e contemporânea. Após seguir as linhas de pensamento de Sexto Empírico, (...) René Descartes, e David Hume, eu vou extrair e identificar claramente as teses centrais que marcam as suas ideias. A minha intenção, porém, não é a de sugerir que as suas teses são auto-evidentes, ou incontestáveis, ou até hoje ainda incontestadas. Muito pelo contrário. A minha intenção é produzir um aperitivo ao debate e um convite a discussão. (shrink)

O objetivo principal deste trabalho é apresentar a distinção entre ciência e cientificismo e, com base no trabalho de van Fraassen, intitulado A imagem científica (2006), discutir sobre as circunstâncias em que o cientificismo poderia ser repudiado. O cientificismo é uma corrente de pensamento que somente considera válido um conhecimento se ele for científico. Segundo essa corrente, os procedimentos da ciência natural seriam mais especiais, uma vez que, dentre outros motivos, eles são capazes de descrever regularidades e possibilitar predições. Dessa (...) forma, o cientificismo defende que os procedimentos não científicos não possuem valor algum, pois não seriam capazes de descrever regularidades e realizar predições como fazem os procedimentos da ciência natural. Trataremos de maneira crítica essa concepção, apresentando o argumento de van Fraassen de que a descrição de uma regularidade também pode ser construída por explicações não científicas. Em sua opinião, o poder explicativo de uma teoria vai além de sua importância empírica, ele é radicalmente dependente do contexto. Isso significa que as regularidades descritas por uma crença científica são também dependentes de explicações não científicas, como as explicações da psicologia, da história, da filosofia, da sociologia, etc. Assim, a forte predição que encontramos na ciência natural não é realizada somente com base na adequação empírica e científica, mas com base em um sistema de explicações não científicas. Isso torna incorreta a classificação do conhecimento científico como o mais verdadeiro ou especial por ser capaz de descrever regularidades e realizar a predições. Pretende-se, com isso, refletir se o conhecimento pode ser construído por outras áreas não científicas, sem que o conhecimento seja com isso prejudicado. Uma reflexão necessária que servirá para apresentar um dos problemas que tornam o cientificismo indesejável. (shrink)

RESUMO A Transferência de Embrião (TE) em bovinos se trata de uma técnica mundialmente disseminada com objetivo de aumentar a capacidade reprodutiva da fêmea. Mantém vínculo direto com outras técnicas das biotecnologias da reprodução, como, a Ovum Pick-Up (OPU), Produção In Vitro e In Vivo de embriões (PIVE) e Transferência de Embrião em Tempo Fixo (TETF), sendo estas, técnicas que fazem parte de um processo, que vai desde a seleção de doadoras, passando pelo preparo dos embriões até sua inovulação em (...) receptoras criteriosamente selecionadas. Com seu avanço, várias tecnologias de manejo vêm sendo implantadas: formas no transporte de embriões, protocolos de sincronização de doadoras e receptoras, e protocolos de recuperação de oócitos para produção de embriões. Isto infundiu a tecnologia, porém, os investimentos previstos para a produção de um animal de alto mérito genético limita sua utilização. Contudo, esta análise abordou avanços tecnológicos essenciais para o sucesso da TE, incluindo novos protocolos, sexagem de embriões, além do uso de embriões congelados Direct Transfer (DT) e vitrificados. No entanto, é claro que o sucesso do procedimento está no processo como um todo, em destaque ressalta-se que é de grande valia que o profissional apto a executar a técnica esteja sempre preparado e atualizado garantindo qualidade, eficiência e sustentabilidade na pecuária. Esta revisão foi desenvolvida com o propósito de adquirir conhecimento teórico, de forma detalhada e crítica, nas técnicas e procedimentos de Transferência de Embriões em bovinos, incluindo a colheita, manipulação e implantação de embriões. Palavras-chaves: Bovino, doadora, embrião, receptora. ABSTRACT Embryo Transfer (ET) in cattle is a globally widespread technique aimed at enhancing the reproductive capacity of females. It is closely linked to other techniques in reproductive biotechnologies, such as Ovum Pick-Up (OPU), In Vitro and In Vivo Embryo Production (PIVE), and Timed Embryo Transfer (TET), all of which are part of a process that ranges from donor selection, through embryo preparation, to their inoculation into carefully chosen recipients. With its advancement, various management technologies have been implemented: including methods for embryo transport, synchronization protocols for donors and recipients, and oocyte recovery protocols for embryo production. Although technology has been infused, the anticipated investments for producing animals of high genetic merit limit its widespread use. However, this analysis addressed essential technological advances for the success of ET, including new protocols, embryo sexing, as well as the use of frozen-thawed (DT) and vitrified embryos. Nevertheless, it is clear that the success of the procedure lies in the entire process. Notably, it emphasizes the significant value of having a qualified professional who is always prepared and updated to ensure quality, efficiency, and sustainability in livestock farming. This literary review was developed with the purpose of acquiring theoretical knowledge, in a detailed and critical way, on the techniques and procedures of Embryo Transfer in cattle, including the collection, manipulation and implantation of embryos. Keywords: Bovine, donor, embryo, recipient. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS BARUSELLI, P.S; MADUREIRA, E.H. Controle farmacológico do ciclo estral em ruminantes. 2000, Anais.. São Paulo: Fundação da Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia, USP, 2000. BARUSSELI, P.S. et al. Importância do emprego da eCG em protocolos de sincronização para IA, TE e SOV em tempo fixo. Biotecnologia de reprodução em bovinos (3° Simpósio Internacional de Reprodução Animal Aplicada). 2008. BRANDÃO, G.V.R. Revisão de Literatura: Transferência de Embrião em Bovinos. Curitibanos-SC, 2019. BUENO, A.P.; BELTRAN, M.P.; Produção in vitro de embriões bovinos. Revista Científica Eletrônica De Medicina Veterinária. ISSN 1679-7353, ano VI, n.11, Julho, 2008. CAETANO, S.G; SILVA, N.V.S. Inseminação artificial de bovnos em tempo fixo (IATF) – Revisão de literatura. UNIFUCAMP, Monte Carmelo- M.G, Junho, 2023. CARVALHO, V.H.S. et al. Impactos das biotécnicas da reprodução animal e o melhoramento genético na pecuária de corte. PUBVET, São Luis De Montes Belos, v.17, n.8, p.1-10, 2023 DANTAS, K.S.A.; NUNES, C. C. C.; FERREIRA, J.; DANTAS, R. A. A. Seleção de receptoras em um programa de transferência de embriões (PIVE) em bovinos no Nordeste do Brasil. Ciência Animal, Fortaleza, v. 28, p. 1-14, 2018. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia do ciclo estral dos animais domésticos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Transferência de Embriões nos Animais e a Indústria de Embriões no Brasil. DIAS, L.R.O. Fatores que afetam a produção de embriões pela Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI) em bovinos. 2021. 85 f. Tese (Doutorado em [nome do programa]) - Faculdade de Agronomia e Medicina Veterinária, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2021. DOMINGUES, P.F.; LANGONI, H. Manejo Sanitário Animal. Editora de Publicações Biomédicas Ltda - EPUB, Rio de Janeiro, 2001. 209 p. EMBRAPA. MINERAIS NA EFICIÊNCIA REPRODUTIVA DE BOVINOS. SÃO CARLOS- SÃO PAULO 2008. FIDELIS, C.A.S. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo intracornual profunda em bovinos. Dissertação (mestrado acadêmico). Araguaína - TO, 2019. GONÇALVES, R.L.R.; VIANA, J.H.M. Situação atual da produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil e no mundo. In: Anais do XXIII Congresso Brasileiro de Reprodução Animal, 2019, Gramado, RS, 2019, p. 156-159. GOUVEIA, F.F. A Produção in vitro de embriões Bovinos. Monografia (Conclusão do curso de Medicina Veterinária) – Faculdade de Agronomia e Medicina Veterinária, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, 2011. GREGIANINI, J.T.F. et al. Avaliação de embriões bovinos utilizando sêmen sexado e convencional. In: SEMINÁRIO DA EMBRAPA ACRE DE INICIAÇÃO CIENTÍFICA E PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO, 4., 2021, Rio Branco, AC. Atividades agropecuárias e florestais para o desenvolvimento sustentável da Amazônia: Anais... Rio Branco, AC: Embrapa Acre, 2022. Pôster. GUARDA, A.C.A. Biotecnologia na reprodução animal: Uma visão teórico/prática de produção in vitro de embriões bovino. 2023. 28p. Trabalho de Conclusão de curso (Bacharelado de Zootecnia). Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia Goiano – Câmpus Rio Verde, Rio Verde, GO, 2023. HAFEZ, E.S.E.; HAFEZ. Reprodução animal / [coordenador de tradução da 7. ed. original Renato Campanarut Barnabe]. – Barueri, SP : Manole, 2004, il.; HONORATO, M.T. et al. Importância da escolha de receptoras em um programa de transferência de embriões em bovinos. PUBVET, Londrina, V. 7, N. 19, Ed. 242, Art. 1601, Outubro, 2013. HOPPER, R.M. Bovine Reproduction. Wiley Blackwell, Capítulo 78, p. 723-733, 2015. LIMA, Fabio Junior Arruda. Transferência de embriãos em tempo fixo em bovinos: Relato de Caso. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (graduação em medicina veterinária)- Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina-Campus Curitibanos. Curitibanos, 2018. MACHADO, R. et al. Metodologia para obtenção de concepto bovino. Embrapa Pecuária Sudeste, ISSN 1981-2078, São Carlos-SP, 2009. Disponível em:. Acessado em 11 de outubro, 2023 BASTOS, M.R. et al. Criopreservação de embriões bovinos produzidos in vitro. In: MENDONÇA, P. P. et al. (Org.). Tópicos Especiais em Ciência Animal XI. 1. ed. Alegre: CAUFES, 2022. Capítulo 13. MELO, R. et al. Utilização de ECG e FSH em protocolos de superovulação em bovinos. Manejo, Nutrição e Produção Animal: Tópicos Atuais em Pesquisa, v. 1, n. 1, p. 110-116, 2023. OLIVEIRA, C.S. et al. Biotécnicas da Reprodução em Bovinos. EMBRAPA, 2014. PASA, C. Transferência de embriões em bovinos. Biodiversidade, v. 7, n. 1, 2008. PAZZIM, L.V.L. Transferencia de embriões em bovinos: Revisão de literatura. Monografia (Trabalho conclusão de curso) - Universidade federal de Santa Catarina. Curitibanos, 2021. PENITENTE FILHO, J.M. et al. Produção de embriões bovinos in vivo e in vitro. Revista CFMV, Ano XX, p. 73-82, 2014. PENITENTE FILHO, J.M. Produção de Embriões Bovinos In Vivo e In Vitro. 2011. 22 f. Monografia (Especialização) - Curso de Medicina Veterinária, UFV, Viçosa, 2011. PILLA, L.F.C. Congelamento ultra-rapido de embriões bovinos com etilenoglicol associado ou não a trealose. 2005. 37f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Area de concentração em Fisiopatologia da Reprodução), Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria. RIBEIRO, L.V.P.; RIGOLON, L.P.; CAVALIERI, F.L.B.; SEKO, M.B.; MARTINEZ, A.C.; RIBEIRO, M.G.; MARTINS, R.R.; ÁVILA, M.R.; DE CONTI, J.B. Recuperação de oócitos e recuperação in vitro de embriões de vacas estimuladas com FSH ou eCG. Archivos de zootecnia. v. 60, n. 232, p. 1021-1029, 2011. ROCHA, J.R.; SANTOS, L.M. As vantagens da sexagen de embriões em bovinos. Revista científica eletrônica de medicina veterinária, ano IV, n.8, janeiro de 2007. RUBIN, M.I.B; Histórico dos 20 anos da Sociedade Brasileira de Tecnologia de Embriões, 2005. SANTOS, P.H. Impactos da superestimulação ovariana sore a diferenciação das celulas da grranulosa bovina. Dissertação de Mestrado em Farmacologia e Biotecnologia - UNESP. 2017. SEIDEL, G.E.J.; SEIDEL, S. M. Training manual for embryo transfer in cattle 2005. SENEDA, M.M.; ESPER, C.R.; GARCIA, J.M.; ANDRADE, E.R. Aspecto técnicos e biológicos da obtenção de oócitos bovinos: Revisão de Literatura. Ciências agrárias, Londrina, v. 23, n. 1, p. 101-110, 2002. SILVA, D.P.; TOLEDO, H.R.P.; SILVA, R.A.B.; CARVALHO, G.F.; MELO, A.F.; GARCIA, M.S.; et al. Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI): revisão de literatura. Zootecnia: Pesquisa e práticas contemporâneas - volume 2, 255-266, 2021. SPELL, A.R.; BEAL, W.E.; CORAH, L.R.; LAMB, G.C. Evaluating recipient and embryo factors that affect pregnancy rates of embryo transfer in beef cattle. Theriogenology, v. 56, p. 287-297, 2001. SPRÍCIGO, J.F.W.; DODE, M.A.N. Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI): uma Alternativa para Produção de Embriões Bovinos. Embrapa Recursos Genéticos e Biotecnologia, Brasília, 2016. VALLE, E.R. O ciclo estral de bovinos e os métodos de controle. EMBRAPA, 1991. VIANA, J.H.M. Classificação de embriões bovinos produzidos in vivo. Comunicado Técnico (EMBRAPA). ISSN 1678-3131, Juiz De Fora-MG, Novembro, 2009. VIANA, J.H.M. 2017 Statistics of embryo production and transfer in domestic farm animals: Is it a turning point? In 2017 more in vitro-produced than in vivo-derived embryos were transferred worldwide. Embryo Transfer Newsl, v.36(4), p.8-25, 2018. VIANA, J.H.M.; SIQUEIRA, L.G.; PALHAO, M.P.; CAMARGO, L.S.A.; Features and perspectives of the Brazilian in vitro embryo industry. Anim Reprod, v.9, p.12-18, 2012. WÜNSCHE JÚNIOR, A.G et al. Avaliação de uma segunda lavagem uterina sobre a recuperacão de embriões em vacas Nelore. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, Londrina, v. 29, n.3, p. 677-684, jul./set. 2008. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

O presente trabalho visa apresentar a solução dada por Santo Agostinho ao problema do mal, aliado à aparente contraditoriedade entre a presciência de Deus e a liberdade humana. Para isto, será útil como bibliografia principal do filósofo sua obra De libero arbitrio, um livro em forma de diálogo onde o pensador esclarece suas posições acerca do livre-arbítrio e da presciência divina.

Este trabalho tem por finalidade apresentar a doutrina da transubstanciação segundo a visãode Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274), objetivando, sobretudo, apreender as nuances filosóficasdo tema. Busca-se aqui delimitar qual a relevância da abordagem do autor sobre o assunto eavaliar em que medida sua teoria mantém contatos com o aristotelismo e em que medida delese afasta. Para tanto, nessa monografia procuraremos em primeiro lugar introduzir atransubstanciação, evidenciando o caráter histórico do surgimento dessa crença e o gradualrefinamento filosófico anexo à mesma. Em seguida, (...) buscaremos citar as principais basesaristotélicas que Tomás tem em seu arcabouço conceitual, para então dar lugar a uma análisedireta de seus textos, utilizando principalmente a Suma de Teologia e a Suma contra os gentios para avaliar as ideias do filósofo, em especial as de ‘conversão substancial’ e a‘separabilidade dos acidentes’. (shrink)

As a counter-argument to Moore's "Refutation of Idealism," this article explains how the application of non-dualistic idealism reveals the underlying problem in both narrowly defined "esse is principi" brands of idealism and Moore's realism. The issue at hand, this article suggests, is the presupposition that experience naturally forks off into subjective consciousness and particular objects of consciousness. Rather than agree with either Moore or dualistic forms of idealism, the Vedanta-inspired view set forth in this article provides a third option to (...) reject the ontological commitments of the former two philosophical stances. This third stance suggests that reality amounts to consciousness, and, thus, motivates the conclusion that modes of consciousness are what differentiate experience, not the bifurcation of experience into subject and object. (shrink)

David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life, one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism (...) and pro-mortalism . This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman – she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are ‘awful’, it follows that ‘we would be better off to kill ourselves’ (Harman 2009: 784). Though we agree with Harman’s conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatar’s arguments for non-pro-mortalism deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatar’s position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatar’s position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatar’s treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatar’s pro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatar’s anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be. -/- . (shrink)

What concerns me in this paper is a connection between motivation and various duties, especially duties that arise in the context of an institution such as a police force. I shall want to spread my net wider than that and discuss such issues as the role of loyalty in human life, but the focus will come back to the professional loyalties of police officers and, particularly, the discussion of the police culture in the Fitzgerald Report. What is it that motivates (...) people to perform their duties? Perhaps what matters, in the end, is that the duty is done more than why it is done, but motivation will have a lot to do with whether duty is done at all and with how well it is done. Motivation affects efficiency as well as morality and must, therefore, be given considerable thought by anybody concerned with an organization in which people are to perform their duties. (shrink)

When loyalty is discussed, a very rare thing in recent years, it is sometimes listed as one of the virtues and just as often derided. Its relationship to the virtues, or to the other virtues, is difficult to discern, and that is at least partly because the role that judgement plays in loyalty seems odd. The argument of this paper is that there is a core value to loyalty, and that understanding this core value is of critical importance in understanding (...) the virtues despite the fact that loyalty is not itself one of them. I shall suggest at the end of the paper that it is the raw material of the virtues and of at least some vices. (shrink)

I shall be dealing, throughout this book, with a set of related problems: the relationship between morality and reasoning in general, the way in which moral reasoning is properly to be carried on, and why morality is not arbitrary. The solutions to these problems come out of the same train of argument. Morality is not arbitrary, I shall argue, because the acceptance of certain qualities of character as virtues and the rejection of others as vices is forced on us by (...) the co-operative basis of human life. The co-operation in human life is unavoidable; the alternative is a literal Hobbesian state of nature, and that is impossible. It is not that co-operation between people is a good thing or even a very good thing; it is simply unavoidable in human life, and it is impossible unless the qualities of character counted as virtues are encouraged and are at least fairly common. The possibility of human life presupposes a theory of human nature, and working out that theory of human nature is the main job of moral philosophy. These virtues or qualities of character or attitudes lead us towards a theory of reasons. A person with a sense of justice is a person inclined to accept certain sorts of facts as reasons for acting, and if the virtues are presupposed by human life then the acceptance of those sorts of facts as reasons for acting is presupposed by human life. A condition of the life of reasoning beings (a more accurate term here than 'human beings') is that moral reasons are reasons for acting and are at the very basis of reasoning. And from this it follows that properly conducted moral reasoning is ultimately guided by the virtues rather than ultimately guided by a set of rules. (shrink)

Loyalty, by making us identify with others, takes us beyond the very limited self (roughly the self of the Hobbesian natural condition) that is involved in selfishness and that is usually involved when people consider that self-concern, that aspect of human nature that must be limited if we are to live peaceably, is the main stumbling block to morality. Loyalty can thus be thought of as a version of altruism, as an inclination to identify with others and to share their (...) good. That is to say, loyalty seems opposed to the troublesome aspects of self-concern. We would, nevertheless, be mistaken to conclude that it must simply be a good in people, something to be encouraged. The primary issue is: Which loyalties should be encouraged? There is no general truth about the value of loyalty as such. (shrink)

Robert Solomon has presented a version of business ethics in terms of virtues theory. It is a good thing that business ethics should be understood in terms of virtues theory, but the account that Solomon gives is seriously misleading in important respects. "A virtue is a pervasive trait of character that allows one to 'fit into' a particular society and to excel in it," he says. This is something that we might query: what a society will recognize as a virtue (...) might well be what fits that formula, but sometimes we shall want to recognize as a virtue what enabled somebody to stand out against his or her society and change it, and shall want to say that those traits that enable somebody to fit happily into (say) a slave society are vices rather than virtues. That is to say, a society's recognition of virtues, its application of virtues theory in picking out various character traits as valuable, will depend on other judgments common in that society, and we might well differ from that society in those judgments. (shrink)

Qualifications are needed to make the point a tight one, but it seems quite plain that it is wrong to kill people. What is not so plain is why it is wrong to kill people, especially when one considers that the person killed will not be around to suffer the consequences afterwards. He does not suffer as a consequence of his death, and he need not suffer even while dying. There are various conditions more or less commonly accepted as making (...) it not wrong to kill somebody : I may kill somebody if he threatens to kill me and killing him is my only means of defending myself ; I may kill somebody if the leader of my society announces that we are in a state of war with the other person's society ; I may kill somebody if he is my slave or a member of another tribe or has passed the age of 65 ; I may kill somebody if he has committed such crimes as to be declared an outlaw; or I may kill somebody if he is in great and unrelievable pain. Each of these conditions is more or less widely accepted in this society or another as making killing permissible, so one cannot reasonably say simply that it is quite certain that killing people is wrong whether or not it is clear why killing people is wrong. But certainly some cases of killing people are wrong, and in working out just what makes these cases wrong we ought also to be working out just what conditions make killings permissible. (shrink)

There are many problems about business ethics. What I want to deal with is only part of the problem: I want to consider just what can properly be expected of business in general terms by way of ethical behaviour and, along with that, what is special about business ethics and how it is related to the personal morality we are all expected to exhibit in our day-to-day lives; I want to consider how it is that ethical confusions arise from people's (...) mistaking the relationship between personal morality and business ethics; and I want to consider what can be done by way of education in business ethics to raise the standards and just what role philosophical ethics can play in that. (shrink)

Morality is often thought of as non-rational or sub-rational. In Moral Notions, first published in 1967, Julius Kovesi argues that the rationality of morality is built into the way we construct moral concepts. In showing this he also resolves the old Humean conundrum of the relation between 'facts' and 'values'. And he puts forward a method of reasoning that might make 'applied ethics' (at present largely a hodge-podge of opinions) into a constructive discipline. Kovesi's general theory of concepts - important (...) in its own right - is indebted to his interpretation of Plato, and his three papers on Plato, first published here, explain this debt. This new edition of Moral Notions also includes a foreward by Philippa Foot, a biography of the author, and a substantial afterword in which the editors, Robert Ewin and Alan Tapper, explain the signficance of Kovesi's work. (shrink)

Julius Kovesi was a moral philosopher contemporary with Alasdair MacIntyre, and dealing with many of the same questions as MacIntyre. In our view, Kovesi’s moral philosophy is rich in ideas and worth revisiting. MacIntyre agrees: Kovesi’s Moral Notions, he has said, is ‘a minor classic in moral philosophy that has not yet received its due’. Kovesi was not a thinker whose work fits readily into any one tradition. Unlike the later MacIntyre, he was not a Thomistic Aristotelian, nor even an (...) Aristotelian. He saw his viewpoint as Platonic, or perhaps more accurately as Socratic. His writings, unlike MacIntyre’s, have little to say about justice. However, Kovesi did offfer a theory of practical reason. His main contention was that all human social life embodies a set of concepts that govern and guide that life, concepts without which that life would be impossible. These include our moral concepts. For Kovesi, moral concepts are not external to, but constitutive of social life in any of its possible forms. But in the course of his argument he also developed a way of thinking about how concepts work, which we term ‘conceptual functionalism’, and which we will elucidate. (shrink)

Providing heroin to heroin addicts taking part in medical trials to assess the effectiveness of the drug as a treatment alternative, breaches ethical research standards, some ethicists maintain. Heroin addicts, they say, are unable to consent voluntarily to take part in these trials. Other ethicists disagree. In our view, both sides of the debate have an inadequate understanding of voluntariness. In this article we therefore offer a fuller conception, one which allows for a more flexible, case-to-case approach in which some (...) heroin addicts are considered capable of consenting voluntarily, others not. An advantage of this approach, it is argued, is that it provides a safety net to minimize the risk of inflicting harm on trial participants. (shrink)

Die bahnbrechenden wissenschaftlichen Ergebnisse der letzten Jahre erzwingen eine neue philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit den Grundkategorien der Biologie und der benachbarten Disziplinen. Insbesondere die Anwendung neuer informationstechnischer Mittel in der biomedizinischen Forschung und die damit verbundene, kontinuierlich zunehmende Datenflut sowie die Notwendigkeit, ihrer Herr zu werden, erfordern ein konsequentes Nachdenken darüber, wie biologische Daten systematisiert und klassifiziert werden können. Dafür wiederum bedarf es robuster Theorien von Grundbegriffen wie Art, Spezies, Teil, Ganzes, Funktion, Prozess, Fragment, Sequenz, Expression, Grenze, Locus, Umwelt, System usw. (...) Solche Begriffe gehören zum impliziten Wissen jedes Biologen. Sie spiegeln einerseits eine Dimension der biologischen Wirklichkeit wider, die auch vor dem Hintergrund der biologischen Evolution unverändert bleibt. Andererseits verlangt deren theoretische Behandlung nach zeitgemäßen Analoga der in der traditionellen aristotelischen Metaphysik entwickelten Methoden. Zugleich können so die explizit formulierten Theorien und Definitionen bereitgestellt werden, die für computergestützte Informationssysteme unabdingbar sind. Das Entwickeln derartiger Theorien und Definitionen ist eine Aufgabe der Philosophie, die in diesem Sinne herausgefordert ist, zwischen Biologie und Informatik zu vermitteln. (shrink)

This chapter describes the potential far‐reaching consequences of contemplative higher education for the fields of science and medicine.

Purpose Prescription stimulant use as “cognitive enhancers” has been described among undergraduate college students. However, the use of prescription stimulants among future health care professionals is not well characterized. This study was designed to determine the prevalence of prescription stimulant misuse among students at an academic health sciences center. -/- Method Electronic surveys were e-mailed to 621 medical, pharmacy, and respiratory therapy students at East Tennessee State University for four consecutive weeks in fall 2011. Completing the survey was voluntary and (...) anonymous. Surveys asked about reasons for, frequency of, and side effects of nonprescription misuse of prescription stimulants. Given the sensitive material, an opportunity to win one of ten $50 gift cards was used as an incentive. -/- Results Three hundred seventy-two (59.9%) students completed the survey from three disciplines (47.6% medical, 70.5% pharmacy, and 57.6% respiratory therapy). Overall, 11.3% of responders admitted to misusing prescription stimulants. There was more misuse by respiratory therapy students, although this was not statistically significant (10.9% medicine, 9.7% pharmacy, 26.3% respiratory therapy; P = .087). Reasons for prescription stimulant misuse included to enhance alertness/ energy (65.9%), to improve academic performance (56.7%), to experiment (18.2%), and to use recreationally/get high (4.5%). -/- Conclusions Prescription stimulant misuse was prevalent among participating students, but further research is needed to describe prevalence among future health care workers more generally. The implications and consequences of such misuse require further study across professions with emphasis on investigating issues of academic dishonesty (e.g., “cognitive enhancement”), educational quality, and patient safety or health care quality. (shrink)

Until recently, psychologists have conceptualised and studied trust in God (TIG) largely in isolation from contemporary work in theology, philosophy, history, and biblical studies that has examined the topic with increasing clarity. In this article, we first review the primary ways that psychologists have conceptualised and measured TIG. Then, we draw on conceptualizations of TIG outside the psychology of religion to provide a conceptual map for how TIG might be related to theorised predictors and outcomes. Finally, we provide a research (...) agenda for future empirical work in this area, as well as practical applications for counsellors and religious leaders. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...) is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor-made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and (...) Peter van Inwagen). (shrink)

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian (...) epistemology. (shrink)

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

Hermeneutical injustices, according to Miranda Fricker, are injustices that occur “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). For Fricker, the relevant injustice in these cases is the very lack of knowledge and understanding experienced by the subject. In this way, hermeneutical injustices are instances of epistemic injustices, the kind of injustice that “wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge” (...) (Fricker 2007, 5). In this paper, however, I identify different means by which our hermeneutic activities lead to social injustices, of both a practical and epistemic kind, and I identify different ways in which those injustices manifest themselves. Since Fricker’s use of the notion of “hermeneutical injustices” to denote a well-defined kind of injustice is rightfully well-established, I here refer to the more general kinds of injustices I have in mind as “hermeneutic injustices” instead. (shrink)

Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative epistemology: are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy of belief and disbelief? Locke's influential answer was evidentialist: we have an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of obligations, the connection between obligations and reasons to believe, the implausibility of Lockean evidentialism, (...) and some of the alleged connections between agency and justification. (shrink)

Because corporate social responsibility can be beneficial to both companies and its stakeholders, interest in factors that support CSR performance has grown in recent years. A thorough integration of CSR in core business processes is particularly important for achieving effective long-term CSR practices. Here, we explored the individual CSR-related competencies that support CSR implementation in a corporate context. First, a systematic literature review was performed in which relevant scientific articles were identified and analyzed. Next, 28 CSR directors and managers were (...) interviewed. The literature review complemented with interview data resulted in the following eight distinct CSR-related competencies: Anticipating CSR challenges; Understanding CSR-relevant systems and subsystems; Understanding CSR-relevant standards; CSR management competencies, including Leading CSR programs, Managing CSR programs, and Identifying and realizing CSR-related business opportunities; Realizing CSR-supportive interpersonal processes; Employing CSR-supportive personal characteristics and attitudes; Personal value-driven competencies, including Ethical normative competencies, Balancing personal ethical values and business objectives, and Realizing self-regulated CSR-related behaviors and active involvement; and Reflecting on personal CSR views and experiences. Based on these results, implications for further research on this topic, as well as implications for practitioners, are discussed. (shrink)

Traditional approaches to conflict are oriented towards establishing (or re-establishing) consensus, either in the form of a resolution of the conflict or in the form of an ‘agree-to-disagree’ standstill between the stakeholders. In this paper, we criticize these traditional approaches, each for specific reasons, and we propose and develop the agonistic approach to conflict. Based on Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic democratic theory, the agonistic approach to conflict is more welcoming of dissensus, replacing discussion stoppers with discussion starters and replacing standstills with (...) contestation. We illustrate such replacements and develop this approach, we analyse technological conflicts in a concrete R&D setting: the global hydrogen economy. From this context, we focus on the conflict between the proponents of blue hydrogen (drawn from fossil fuels) and those of green hydrogen (created through electrolysis). We conclude by highlighting the advantage of the agonistic approach but also drawing attention to its own specific risk, namely, antagonism. (shrink)

The European project European and Latin American Systems of Ethics Regulation of Biomedical Research Project (EULABOR) has carried out the first comparative analysis of ethics regulation systems for biomedical research in seven countries in Europe and Latin America, evaluating their roles in the protection of human subjects. We developed a conceptual and methodological framework defining ‘ethics regulation system for biomedical research’ as a set of actors, institutions, codes and laws involved in overseeing the ethics of biomedical research on humans. This (...) framework allowed us to develop comprehensive national reports by conducting semi-structured interviews to key informants. These reports were summarised and analysed in a comparative analysis. The study showed that the regulatory framework for clinical research in these countries differ in scope. It showed that despite the different political contexts, actors involved and motivations for creating the regulation, in most of the studied countries it was the government who took the lead in setting up the system. The study also showed that Europe and Latin America are similar regarding national bodies and research ethics committees, but the Brazilian system has strong and noteworthy specificities. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework that will help in understanding and evaluating, along social and ethical lines, the issue of killing day-old male chicks and two alternative directions of responsible innovations to solve this issue. The following research questions are addressed: Why is the killing of day-old chicks morally problematic? Are the proposed alternatives morally sound? To what extent do the alternatives lead to responsible innovation? The conceptual framework demonstrates clearly that there is a (...) moral “lock-in”, and why the killing of day-old chicks is indeed an issue. Furthermore, it is shown that both alternative directions address some important objections with regard to the killing of day-old chicks, but that they also raise new dilemmas. It also becomes clear that the framework enables and secures anticipation, reflection, deliberation with and responsiveness to stakeholders, the four dimensions of responsible innovation, in a structured way. (shrink)

This review confirms Herman’s work as a praiseworthy contribution to East-West and comparative philosophical literature. Due credit is given to Herman for providing English readers with access to Buber’s commentary on, a personal translation of, the Chuang-Tzu; Herman’s insight into the later influence of I and Thou on Buber’s understanding of Chuang-Tzu and Taoism is also appropriately commended. In latter half of this review, constructive criticisms of Herman’s work are put forward, such as formatting inconsistencies, a tendency toward verbosity and (...) jargon, and a neglect of seemingly important hermeneutical issues. Such issues, seemingly substantive but neglected by Herman, are the influence of Buber’s prior familiarity with Hasidic teachings on his encounter with Chuang-Tzu, as well as the prevalence of Hasidic and Taoist thought in Buber’s conception of good and evil. (shrink)

R&D collaborations between industry, government, civil society, and research (also known as ‘quadruple helix collaborations’ (QHCs)) have recently gained attention from R&D theorists and practitioners. In aiming to come to grips with their complexity, past models have generally taken a stakeholder-analytical approach based on stakeholder types. Yet stakeholder types are difficult to operationalise. We therefore argue that a processual model is more suited for studying the interaction in QHCs because it eschews matters of titles and identities. We develop such a (...) model in which the QHC is represented as a process of generating four types of value: research value, market value, political value, and societal value. We then apply this processual model in analysing reallife cases of friction in QHCs. Friction is seen, not as an interpersonal clash, but as a discrepancy between two or more value-creation processes that compete for limited resources (some overperforming while others under-performing). (shrink)

Initial responses to questionnaires used to assess participants' understanding of informed consent for malaria vaccine trials conducted in the United States and Mali were tallied. Total scores were analyzed by age, sex, literacy (if known), and location. Ninety-two percent (92%) of answers by United States participants and 85% of answers by Malian participants were correct. Questions more likely to be answered incorrectly in Mali related to risk, and to the type of vaccine. For adult participants, independent predictors of higher scores (...) were younger age and female sex in the United States, and male sex in Mali. Scores in the United States were higher than in Mali (P = 0.005). Despite this difference participants at both sites were well informed overall. Although interpretation must be qualified because questionnaires were not intended as research tools and were not standardized among sites, these results do not support concerns about systematic low understanding among research participants in developing versus developed countries. (shrink)

We propose the use of discussion structures as tools for analyzing policy debates in a way that enables the increased participation of lay stakeholders. Discussion structures are argumentation-theoretical tools that can be employed to tackle three barriers that separate lay stakeholders from policy debates: difficulty, magnitude, and complexity. We exemplify the use of these tools on a debate in research policy on the question of responsibility. By making use of discussion structures, we focus on the argumentative moves performed by the (...) parties involved in this debate. We conclude by discussing advantages and limitations of discussion structures and we trace several opportunities for further research on these instruments. (shrink)

The term philosophy of chemistry is here construed broadly to include some publications from the history of chemistry and chemical education. Of course this initial selection of material has inevitably been biased by the interests of the author. This bibliography supersedes that of van Brakel and Vermeeren (1981), although no attempt has been made to include every single one of their entries, especially in languages other than English. Also, readers interested particularly in articles in German may wish to consult the (...) bibliography by Dittus and Mayer which also contains some material not included here (Dittus and Mayer, 1992). The aim is to maintain an up-to-date version of this bibliography and to publish a revised version in due course. Suggestions for further inclusions should be sent to the author. (shrink)

Despite a large and multifaceted effort to understand the vast landscape of phenotypic data, their current form inhibits productive data analysis. The lack of a community-wide, consensus-based, human- and machine-interpretable language for describing phenotypes and their genomic and environmental contexts is perhaps the most pressing scientific bottleneck to integration across many key fields in biology, including genomics, systems biology, development, medicine, evolution, ecology, and systematics. Here we survey the current phenomics landscape, including data resources and handling, and the progress that (...) has been made to accurately capture relevant data descriptions for phenotypes. We present an example of the kind of integration across domains that computable phenotypes would enable, and we call upon the broader biology community, publishers, and relevant funding agencies to support efforts to surmount today's data barriers and facilitate analytical reproducibility. (shrink)